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We estimate Shiller portfolio weights for OECD countries and US states. We
ﬁnd that the income of US federal states is derived to about 50 percent from
own output, that of OECD countries to about 60 percent.
This suggests that US states display considerable ’home bias at home’
and that the international portfolio home bias may be relatively less severe
than evidence based on models of optimal portfolio allocation would suggest.
We relate the estimated portfolio weights to the structure of regional and
international business cycles. In particular, we can reproduce the empirical
evidence on inter-state and international income ﬂows.
Keywords: Consumption Risk Sharing, International and regional busi-
ness cycles, Capital ﬂows, Home Bias, Non-stationary panel data
JEL classiﬁcation: C23, E21, F361 Introduction
This paper links the evidence on international and interregional portfolio
holdings to the structure of business cycles.
The empirical literature documents that ﬁnancial markets are a lot less
integrated between countries than within them.1 Most studies consider re-
gressions of idiosyncratic consumption growth on other idiosyncratic vari-
ables, notably relative output growth, to ﬁnd the associated coeﬃcients are
a lot higher in international data than in national (regional) data sets.
This lack of international consumption risk sharing seems to ﬁnd its nat-
ural correspondence in the home bias puzzle of international ﬁnance: French
and Poterba (1991) but also studies based on more recent data such as Lane
(2000) and Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2000) ﬁnd that country port-
folios are biased towards domestic assets. In contrast to the relative lack of
international consumption risk sharing, the extent of portfolio home bias is
typically measured against the benchmark of models of optimal portfolio al-
location. Such calculations may tend to overestimate the extent of portfolio
diversiﬁcation that international ﬁn a n c i a li n t e g r a t i o nm a yb r i n ga l o n gs i n c e
it is not clear ap r i o r ithat regional portfolios themselves are completeley
diversiﬁed. That there could be a ’home bias at home’2 seems plausible once
one recognizes that many of the potential explanations of the home bias puz-
zle that have been suggested are not necessarily speciﬁc to countries: labour
income is likely to be non-insurable; local equity may provide a better hedge
against (local) inﬂation risk (since its returns are more strongly inversely
related to domestic inﬂation than foreign returns) and international or inter-
regional diversiﬁcation may be implicit since domestic companies have oper-
ations in other regions or countries that generate returns that are a hedge
for local consumption.3
While this list of plausible causes of a regional home bias could probably
be extended, one message from the consumption risk sharing literature is, in
fact, that even (US) regions do not share all their idiosyncratic risk. (see e.g.
the results in Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996)). It is therefore possible
a n dl i k e l yt h a te v e nr e g i o n a lp o r t f o l i o si nw e l li n t e g r a t e dn a t i o n a lﬁnancial
1Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Sørensen and Yosha (1998), Hess and Shin
(1998), Crucini (1999), Lane (2001), Becker and Hoﬀmann (2001)
2Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show that there is a home bias even in portfolios of
domestic stocks. U.S. Fund managers seem to prefer equity of locally headquartered
companies.
3These potential explanations are explored in Lewis (1999) who concludes that non
of these factors in itself is suﬃcient to explain the home bias but that they are likely to
interact in a complex way.
1markets may display considerable home bias.
Unfortunately, the extent of regional home bias at the regional level can-
not be directly assessed since good data on regional portfolios do not exist.
Furthermore, even to the extent that these data exist - as they do for coun-
tries - the international income ﬂows that these portofolios generate cannot
be observed.
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to develop empirical measures of in-
ternational regional portfolio diversiﬁcation based on the concept of a Shiller
(1993) portfolio of perpetual claims to a country’s income. Our approach
oﬀers the advantage that regional portfolios can be estimated and compared
to those of entire countries. In this way, we overcome the lack of data on
portfolio cross-holdings at the regional level. Furthermore, the simplicity of
our framework allows us to generate artiﬁcial income ﬂow data which can
then be compared with actually observed cross-country and cross-regional
income ﬂows.
Our evidence is based on US state level data from 1960-90 and data for
OECD countries from 1960-2000. We ﬁnd that US states still have a home
bias of around 50 percent, whereas countries have a home bias of 90 percent
in the period 1960-90 but only of 60 percent in the period 1980-2000. This
provides a new benchmark as to the degree of portfolio diversiﬁcation that we
should expect to see at the international level as ﬁnancial markets continue
to become more integrated. We then ask to what extent the estimated port-
folio structure can replicate income ﬂows that are in line with actual GNP
and state disposable income data. Our results suggest that the estimated
portfolio structure supports income ﬂows that are similar to those observed
in the real world. In particular, we can replicate the evidence on the relative
roles of ex-ante and ex-post risk sharing in national and international data.
The observation that both US federal states as well as industrialized coun-
tries seem incompletely diversiﬁed leads us to the second contribution of this
paper: we recognize that if diversiﬁcation is incomplete, the amount of risk
sharing that is eventually achieved will also depend on the structure of idio-
syncratic risk, i.e. the structure of business cycles. It is therefore important
to ask, to what extent diﬀerences in business cycle structure (e.g. w.r.t to
synchronization, relative persistence and volatility) between industrialized
countries on the one hand and between US states on the other can account
for the apparent lack of international consumption risk sharing as it is de-
tected by standard risk sharing regressions.
Here we ﬁnd that industrialized countries would indeed be more insured
if international business cycles had the same features as US regional cycles.
However, this lever is not suﬃciently important to account for the lack of in-
ternational consumption risk sharing. Rather, we document that US federal
2states are a lot more successful in obtaining consumption insurance because
they are better insured against permanent variation in their relative outputs.
Because insurance against permanent variation cannot be achieved ex-post,
i.e. through borrowing or lending, our ﬁndings are in line with Asdrubali,
Sørensen and Yosha (1996) who ﬁnd a lot more ex-ante risk sharing in US
state level data than in international data and with Kraay, Loayza, Serven
and Ventura (2000) who also document that countries’ net foreign asset po-
sitions are biased towards loans and bonds.
A by-product of our paper is that it can reconcile apparently contradictory
ﬁndings in the literature on consumption risk sharing between regions and
countries. So, Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996)4 ﬁnd that roughly a
quarter of all idiosyncratic output risk remains uninsured in US data. Using
ad i ﬀerent data set, Crucini (1999) ﬁnds that the null that all idiosyncratic
risk is insured in US data cannot be rejected. Using the same data set for
the two diﬀerent regression speciﬁcations run by ASY and Crucini, we can
reproduce their respective results. As our discussion is going to show, the
interpretation of the estimated coeﬃcients is diﬀerent: Crucini estimates how
much of the permanent variation in the data gets insured, given a country’s
portfolio whereas ASY obtain an estimate that measures how much risk is
shared, given the country portfolio and the structure of business cycles.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section two we
discuss the measurement of risk sharing using consumption data. In section
three we introduce the model and its implications for the measurement of risk
sharing and diversiﬁcation. In section four we present our data and estimate
the Shiller portfolio weights. In section ﬁve we relate the estimated portfolio
weights to international income ﬂows and discuss to what extent diﬀerences
in business cycle structure can account for the apparent lack of risk sharing
at the international level. Section six summarizes and concludes.
2 Measuring risk sharing and portfolio diver-
siﬁcation
In a world with complete capital markets, countries and regions will insure
completely against any idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, ex post,t h e r es h o u l d
not be any correlation between a country’s or region’s relative output and
consumption. This fundamental insight was ﬁrst applied to household level
data by Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994). These
authors suggested to run regressions of idiosyncratic consumption growth on
4We will henceforth abbreviate the reference to this paper as ‘ASY’.
3idiosyncratic income growth.
In country-level data, household income is typically replaced by per capita
GDP. The basic risk sharing regression to which we will refer throughout this














t are the logarithms of consumption and GDP in country k
respectively and εt is a disturbance term. ‘Rest of the World’-variables are
denoted by an asterisk. Under the null of complete markets this regression
should yield a coeﬃcient of zero.
The acknowledgment that real world ﬁnancial markets are likely to be in-
complete in many ways has subsequently led to a more pragmatic approach
in applied work. Rather than testing the null of complete markets, i.e. b =0 ,
Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996)as well as Sørensen and Yosha (1998)
have argued very convincingly that the coeﬃcient in the risk sharing re-
gression may be of interest in itself and that it should be interpreted as a
measure of the extent of risk sharing. Applying this insight to US state level
data, ASY ﬁnd that roughly a quarter of idiosyncratic output ﬂuctuations
remain uninsured. Conversely, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) show that among
OECD countries, more than 70 percent of idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations remain
uninsured.
The basic risk sharing regression is motivated by a benchmark model
with complete markets. The coeﬃcient b is then a natural metric of the
deviation from the complete markets outcome. However, one has to be wary
not to directly interpret b as a measure of international diversiﬁcation. In this
paper, we introduce a distinction between the degree of diversiﬁcation and
the degree of insurance that a given degree of diversiﬁcation may achieve. By
diversiﬁcation we mean the share of international assets in a country’s total
wealth. By insurance we mean to what extent variability in idiosyncratic
consumption is shielded from variability in output.
While these two concepts are identical in the long-run, they may mean
diﬀerent things in the short-run: b measures the extent of insurance, but
we will see that it does not necessarily measure the degree of international
portfolio diversiﬁcation if diversiﬁcation is incomplete. If we want to use
the diﬀerence of country-level and regional measures of risk sharing to learn
about the underlying home bias in portfolios, we will therefore need to gauge
the extent to which diﬀerent business cycle structure may account for the
diﬀerential success in obtaining insurance.
Why do we not base our notion of the degree of diversiﬁcation on a mea-
sure of net foreign assets? Firstly, data on cross-regional portfolio holdings
4do not exist, at least not on a broader basis and over suﬃciently long time
horizons. It is therefore impossible to gauge the extent of the national home
bias relative to a (potentially present) regional home bias.
Secondly, for our purposes, it may be problematic to classify a given asset
as domestic or foreign. While this may be quite simple with respect to the eq-
uity of a local barber shop (unless it is run by an international or interregional
chain), it is clearly problematic with respect to multinational companies that
may be listed on one country’s stock exchange but own subsidiaries or plants
in many countries.
More importantly, even if we knew the composition of both country-level
as well as regional portfolios, we would still need to know the associated
interest rates and dividend payments in order to reconstruct international
or interregional income ﬂows. This would be a fabulously complex task.
We avoid it by using a simple model that allows us to distinguish between
portfolio diversiﬁcation and insurance.
We therefore prefer to use the construct of a portfolio of Shiller-securities
to measure a country’ s or regions diversiﬁcation. While such a portfolio may
not be directly observable, Shiller (1993) has argued very convincingly that
it is a useful abstract concept that can serve as a benchmark. Contrasting
this ‘portfolio’ with standard consumption based measures of risk sharing can
shed light on the sources of the home bias and the structure of international
and interregional risk sharing arrangements. We turn to a formal exposition
of our model in the next section.
3 Country portfolios and business cycle struc-
ture
In this paper we adapt the simple theoretical framework suggested by Crucini
(1999) to estimate country portfolio shares. The asset market structure is
given by a set of Shiller (1993) securities. Each country chooses to allocate
its wealth across two assets: one perpetual claim to domestic output and
a mutual fund of perpetual claims to world average output. The degree of
portfolio diversiﬁcation is then given by the share of holdings of the world
mutual fund in the country’s total stock of assets.
In presenting our approach, it will be useful to emphasize the distinction
between ex-ante and ex-post risk sharing.5 International and interregional
diversiﬁcation pertains to an ex-ante sharing of risk through the cross-border
holdings of assets.
5ASY (1996) were the ﬁrst to empirically explore this distinction.
5Ex post, that is after the realization of this period’s uncertainty, consump-
tion should be determined by permanent income. Under full risk sharing,
country k’s per capita consumption should correspond to world per capita



















where r is the world real interest rate.6 Once we recognize that ex-ante
risk sharing may be incomplete country k’s permanent income should be a







t +( 1 − λ)Y
kP
t (2)
Here λ can be interpreted as the degree of diversiﬁcation into a perpetual
claim on world average per capita output. Our setup so far is identical
to that of Crucini (1999). But Crucini, in keeping with most of the earlier
literature uses (2) to motivate a risk sharing regressions in relative growth
rates. We will use (2) to derive a panel regression of relative (logarithmic)
consumption and output levels.
We therefore now proceed to derive an estimable levels regression from












w h e r ew eh a v ei n t r o d u c e dπk as a country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect to account
for diﬀerences in the mean of relative consumption. These may arise due





















6Hereafter, we will not repeat the qualiﬁcation ‘per capita’, as it will generally be
obvious where it should appear.
6Doing the same for relative permanent outputs, we get
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where πk can now be removed as a country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect. Having














where we have used the approximation that log
¡
Y P¢
=( l o gY )
P = yP
for which we provide a justiﬁcation in the appendix.
This equation is reminiscent of Mace (1991), Asdrubali, Sørensen and
Yosha (1996), Cochrane (1991) or Crucini (1999). It relates relative con-
sumption to relative output. Under full risk sharing, the coeﬃcient on rela-
tive (permanent) output should be zero. The decisive diﬀerence vis-à-vis the
earlier literature is that equation (5) relates relative log-levels whereas the
basic risk sharing regression is formulated in diﬀerences.
We will show that the coeﬃcients of the levels regressions are not only
numerically diﬀerent from those of the diﬀerenced regressions, but also have a
diﬀerent interpretation: the levels regression identiﬁe st h ed e g r e eo fp o r t f o l i o
diversiﬁcation, whereas the diﬀe r e n c e dr e g r e s s i o nt e l l su sh o wm u c hi n s u r a n c e
is achieved, given the degree of portfolio diversiﬁcation and the structure of
business cycles. We discuss this important distinction in the next subsection
Once we have estimated λ, we can then use (2) to generate artiﬁcial
income data. We then use the decomposition suggested by ASY (1996),
to gauge the plausibility of these estimated country and regional portfolio
shares by asking whether the artiﬁcial income data reproduce the structure
of interregional and international income ﬂows observed in actual data. Here,
the simplicity of our framework pays oﬀ because it allows us to link estimated
stocks to observed ﬂows
3.1 Risk sharing regressions: levels vs. diﬀerences
Why can we not just diﬀerence equation (5) to obtain the well-known basic
risk sharing regression?
The reason for this is that in log-linearizing (3) we have made the as-
sumption that the cross-sectional dispersion of output and consumption is
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Since we believe this approximation only to hold for the average country
in the cross-section, it is an approximation of the long-run behaviour of the
data. This cross-sectional perspective on risk sharing has not been used in
macro studies. It is similar in spirit to the test for market completeness
suggested by Cochrane (1991). Cochrane argues that measuring risk sharing
based on cross-sectional data is likely to be more robust to changes in relative
shadow prices, or non-separabilities in utility. A similar argument applies in
our setting: the level (panel) regression is much more likely to be robust to
short-term ﬂuctuations in the economic environment, i.e. to the structure of
idiosyncratic business cycles.
The logarithmic levels equation (5) will describe a long-run relation in the
data.7 To see that the coeﬃcient estimate in the diﬀerenced regression can
deviate substantially from that of the levels regression, let us again consider









Dividing by lagged relative levels we can derive the following log-linear









where Zkt−1 = Ykt−1/Y ∗
t−1.
Clearly, whenever Zkt = 1 or whenever the degree of diversiﬁcation is zero
or unity, the diﬀerenced regression will carry the same message as the level-
regression. However, for intermediate values of λ, Zkt will be correlated with
[∆ykt − ∆y∗
kt] and the sample (time-dimension) mean of Zkt may not equal
unity. Therefore, the regression of relative consumption growth on relative
output growth does not necessarily identify the degree of diversiﬁcation. To
this end, one should rather use the levels equation (5).
7The distinction between a long-term levels regression and a short-term diﬀerenced
regression is similar to the notion of long-term relations in the literature on cointegrated
systems. Indeed, interpreting the level relation as a cointegrating relation is perfectly
in line with our reasoning. However, we prefer a more general interpretation as a long-
run relation in a non-stationary but potentially non-cointegrated panel data set. For a
discussion of the econometric issues involved, see Phillips and Moon (2000).
8This is not tantamount to saying that the basic risk sharing regression in
diﬀerences is misspeciﬁed. As becomes apparent from (6), the estimate of b
will also depend on the covariance structure of
(1−λ)Zkt−1
(1−λ)Zkt−1+λ and ∆y−∆y∗, i.e.
on the structure of business cycles. One of the main arguments we wish to
put forward in this paper is that diﬀerenced regressions reveal how much risk
is shared, given the degree of portfolio diversiﬁcation, λ, and the structure
of business cycles, whereas the level equation can help us to identify the
underlying degree of portfolio diversiﬁcation itself.
In a separate subsection at the end of the paper, we provide an applica-
tion of this insight: we explore if and how the relative roles of permanent and
transitory variation in macroeconomic ﬂuctuations both at the international
and the regional level matter for consumption insurance. To the extent that
it is harder to insure against permanent than against transitory variation in
relative outputs, countries could be less insured simply because they experi-
ence more persistent shocks to output than do US states. While we ﬁnd that
this channel cannot explain the magnitude of the lack of consumption risk
sharing, our ﬁndings emphasize the importance of distinguishing between
the amount of portfolio diversiﬁcation and the amount of insurance that this
diversiﬁcation achieves.




We apply our approach two data sets: one for U.S. states and one for a group
of 23 OECD countries. All data are annual.
The US-data set is the one also used by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha8
and is based on gross-state product and income data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). Since consumption data at the state level is not
available, it is common practice9 to use retail sales data by state. These
retail sales data are rescaled by the share of retail sales in aggregate (US-
wide) consumption too obtain measures of state level consumption data. All
data are deﬂated by the US-wide consumpion price index. The US-data
range from 1960 to 1990.
8The data base is available at Oved Yosha’s web page
http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/riskshare/channels/channels.htm
9Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Hess and Shin (1998) and DelNegro(2002) all
follow this approach.
9Country-level data are from the Penn World Table, release 6.1 (PWT
6.1.) by Heston, Summers and Aten (2002) and range from 1960 to 2000.
All data are in constant (1996) international prices. The countries included
in our estimation are:
1. Canada, 2. the United States,3. Japan, 4. Austria, 5. Belgium,
6. Denmark , 7. Finland, 8. France, 9. Germany (West), 10. Greece, 11.
Iceland, 12. Ireland, 13. Italy, 14. Luxemburg, 15. Netherlands, 16. Norway,
17. Portugal, 18. Spain, 19. Sweden, 20. Switzerland, 21. United Kingdom,
22. Australia, 23. New Zealand.
Most of these countries are OECD countries and we will refer to them
under this label. As regards the US, we follow the general practice in the US
regional business cycle literature and include all states except Washington
D.C.
We express all data in per capita terms. Rest of the World (RoW) aggre-
gates are the US- or OECD-wide average per capita values. Population data
are from the BEA and PWT respectively.
Over the sample period covered by our international data set, interna-
tional ﬁnancial markets have become increasingly liberalized. To take ac-
count of this change, we will report results obtained for two subperiods: the
ﬁrst covers the period 1960-1990, the second covers 1980-2000. The results
we obtain from the ﬁrst sub period can be compared directly to others in
the literature (the studies by Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and Crucini (1999)
cover the same period), while the results from the second sub period shoulld
provide insights into the eﬀects of the daramatic increase in net international
asset positions that took place in the 1990s and 1990s (compare e.g. the data
in Lane (2000) and Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2001)).
4.2 First results - basic risk sharing regressions
For good econometric reasons, the empirical literature on consumption risk
sharing has focused on regressions of growth rates rather than levels. Both
idiosyncratic output and consumption are typically found to be integrated
processes. The risk sharing regression in levels is likely to be spurious in time
series unless there is a cointegrating restriction between the two variables. In
panel data diﬀerencing also removes any individual speciﬁc trend or mean in
the variables.
The ﬁrst line in table 1 provides the results of basic risk sharing regressions
for both U.S. and international data. Roughly three quarters of idiosyncratic
output variability remains uninsured in country-level data, in the later pe-
riod (1980-2000), more than 80 percent. Only 15 percent of idiosyncratic
variability spills over into consumption in U.S. state level data, results.
10The state-level results are somewhat below the estimate obtained by As-
drubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) (who use a more elaborate estimation
procedure than we do here) but slightly higher than the estimates obtained
by Crucini (1999). At the country level, the results are very close to the
estimates in Sørensen and Yosha (1998). Hence, our basic risk sharing re-
gressions clearly reproduce the general pattern that is documented in the
literature: there is a lot more risk sharing in regional data than there is in
country-level data, but even at the regional or state level, risk sharing is not
complete.
We will not discuss these results any further but present them here as a
point of reference. We will refer back to table 1 as the results of the ‘baseline
speciﬁcation’, or equivalently, of the ‘basic risk sharing regression’.
4.3 Estimating portfolio shares
We now turn to estimating the degree of home bias in country and regional
portfolios based on the risk sharing regression in relative log-levels.
Because relative consumption and output levels are likely to be integrated
variables, country-by-country regressions could potentially yield spurious re-
sults. The spurious regression problem, does not arise, however, once we
exploit the panel dimension of the data set, even if the data are not coin-
tegrated (see Phillips and Moon (2000)). In all our panel regressions, we
remove country-speciﬁcm e a n s .
Equation (5) tells us that the identiﬁcation of λ requires to regress relative
consumption levels on relative permanent levels of output.
We construct two diﬀerent measures of yP and y∗P : one is based on a uni-
variate AR(1) process for (log) home and foreign output respectively, whereas
the other one models the joint dynamics of (log) foreign and home output


























In the appendix, we describe the construction of yP and y∗P in detail.
To check that our results are robust with respect to the particular way in
which we construct the permanent levels, we also run the level risk sharing
regression with actual relative log-levels instead of permanent levels values.
Since business cycle deviations from trend are small as a percentage of the
level variables, we should expect that y −yP is relatively small. Irrespective
11of what measure of yP we use, we should therefore obtain broadly similar
results from the regressions with plain and with constructed permanent levels.
We present our results in table 2, both for the ‘plain levels’ as well as for
the permanent levels speciﬁcations. The results are very consistent across
the diﬀerent speciﬁcations and carry a clear message:
For US federal states, we ﬁnd a home bias of around 40-50 percent. In
international data, we estimate a home bias of 96 percent in the 1960-90
period. For the later period, we estimate (1−λ) to be around 0.66,c o n s i d e r -
ably lower than in the 1960-90 period. This latter ﬁnding is in line with the
evidence reported by researchers who have examined international portfolio
holdings directly (Lane (2000), Kraay et al. (2000)) and who report a con-
siderably increase in the net foreign asset positions of OECD countries over
the last two decades.
These results suggest that, at least for the 1980-2000 period, in the metric
of Shiller portfolio, the home bias for the average industrialized country is
not much higher than it is for the average US state.
Figures 1 and 2 further illustrate the evolution of the home bias in OECD
data. Figures 1 a) and b) display the link between relative consumption and
output in the international data set for the two subperiods. It becomes
apparent that the cloud of points is a lot more dispersed in the later period.
In ﬁgure 2, we superimpose the US-data set (dots) on the OECD data set
(crosses), again in the 1960-90 (panel a)and in the 1980-90 (panel b)periods.
At least in the later period, the OECD cloud displays virtually the same
degree of dispersion as does the US data set.
The estimates in table 2 as well as ﬁgure 2 suggest that diversiﬁcation
in the sense of a portfolio of country- or region- Shiller securities is by far
less complete in U.S. state level data than would appear from the basic risk
sharing regression in table 1. There is certainly a huge home bias in inter-
national portfolios, but even at the regional level we ﬁnd that U.S. citizens
own a disproportionate share of the claims to output of the federal state in
which they live.
Our results provide a fresh perspective on the home bias by taking account
of those components of a nation’s or region’s output risk that are not traded
in ﬁnancial markets: the equity of small ﬁrms or companies is most likely
not traded across countries or regions nor are claims to the labour share of
national or regional outputs. Our estimates seem to reﬂect this.
125D i v e r s i ﬁcation and business cycles
The central question of this paper is how a given degree of portfolio di-
versiﬁcation interacts with the structure of macroeconomic disturbances to
generate the stylized facts from the basic risk sharing regression in diﬀer-
ences. To understand this interaction, it is important to know whether the
p o r t f o l i os h a r e st h a tw eh a v ee s t i m a t e da r ei nl i n ew i t hc r o s s - b o r d e ri n c o m e
ﬂows. This helps us to gauge the plausibility of our estimated portfolio shares
(that are unobservable, after all) and it should give us further insights into
the nature of the home bias in both national and international data.
In the next subsection we therefore compare the ﬂow evidence on ex-post
and ex-ante risk sharing with the evidence on ‘stocks’ of cross-holdings of
assets as it is captured by our estimates of λ.
As we will see, the estimated portfolio shares do indeed support the evi-
dence on cross-regional and international income ﬂows. Since the estimated
international portfolio shares for OECD countries and US federal states esti-
mated from data of the last two decades are relatively similar, this raises the
question, why the basic risk sharing regression detects so much less insurance
in international than in US state level data.
Clearly, according to equation (6), diﬀerences in the structure of business
cycles could be responsible for this ﬁnding. Conversely, it is possible that
the existing portfolio structure allows US states to insure against certain
types of risk that countries cannot insure against. One important dimension
along which this may be the case is the relative contribution of permanent
and transitory components in business cycle ﬂuctuations. Insurance against
permanent idiosyncratic shocks requires trade in state contingent assets. In
this respect, (intra-) national ﬁnancial markets may indeed be more complete
than international ones. We explore this issue in the second part of this
section.
5.1 Ex-ante and ex-post risk sharing
ASY (1996) were the ﬁrst authors to explore empirically to what extent con-
sumption smoothing is achieved through either ex-ante insurance or ex-post
smoothing. While ASY report that more than 40 percent of relative income
variability gets smoothed ex-ante, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) report that this
channel is virtually inactive in international data. The contribution of ex-
post smoothing, is, however, comparable in both international and national
data. Can this evidence be reconciled with estimates of international or in-
terregional portfolio shares of around 50 percent in regional and 20 percent
in international data, as we have obtained them from our analysis?
13In their work, ASY and Sørensen and Yosha associate the ex-ante chan-
nel of risk sharing with cross-border capital income ﬂows, as measured by
the diﬀerence between GDP and GNP (income). Ex ante risk sharing can
therefore be thought of as income smoothing. Ex-post risk sharing is then the
smoothing of consumption through borrowing and lending in credit markets.
Our framework formalizes these notions of ex ante and ex post risk shar-
ing. Income smoothing is achieved through the ex-ante diversiﬁcation into
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t (9)
Our estimates of λ appear quite plausible in the sense that US states are
by no means fully diversiﬁed but clearly much more so than industrialized
countries. In order to gauge the quantitative plausibility of our estimates of λ,
we now generate artiﬁcial income data according to (9), using the estimated
portfolio structure. We can then compare these simulated data to actual
GNP or US state income data. More speciﬁcally, we can ask whether the
artiﬁcial data give us quantitatively similar relative contributions of ex-ante
and ex-post risk sharing as actual data do.



























Here, βa measures the extent of ex-ante risk sharing and ‘inc‘ denotes the
logarithm of income constructed according to (9).


























and βp now measures ex-post risk sharing.
A S Ya l s oc o n s i d e raﬁscal transfer channel. We cannot identify such a
channel based on our simple theoretical setup. However, we note that most
ﬁscal transfers are not discretionary but based on rules or laws that have been
set ex-ante. W ew o u l dt h e r e f o r ea r g u et h a tﬁscal transfers provide mainly
ex-ante insurance.
Table (3) contains our results and juxtaposes them to the ﬁndings ob-
tained in ASY(1996) and Sørensen and Yosha (1998). In U.S. data, we do
indeed ﬁnd that the amount of ex-ante risk sharing in actual state (dispos-
able) income data and in the artiﬁcial data is almost the same. Our point
estimate for the artiﬁcial data is also virtually the same as the one obtained
in ASY (1996), if one includes ﬁscal transfers in the ex-ante channel. This
14r e s u l ti ss t r o n ge v i d e n c et h a tac o n s t a n th o m eb i a so fa r o u n d4 0t o5 0p e r -
cent in U.S. state level data is also quantitatively very plausible because it
supports the (ﬂow) evidence from national accounting data.
Our model is also able to approximate the relative roles of ex-ante and
ex-post risk sharing in international data, but only in the early period, i.e.
1960-90. Hence, a home bias of 0.95 is broadly consistent with cross-border
income ﬂo w st h a th e l pt os m o o t hb e t w e e n0a n dt e np e r c e n to fv o l a t i l i t yi n
idiosyncratic output growth.
In the period 1980-2000 however, an estimated degree of diversiﬁcation of
around 0.6 does not support GDP-GNP diﬀerentials that can approximate
the stylized fact identiﬁe db yS ø r e n s e na n dY o s h aa n dr e p l i c a t e dh e r e :t h e
virtual shut-oﬀ of the ex-ante channel in international data. Our estimates
of ex-ante risk sharing turn out to be far too high (0.43).
In table 4 we report the correlations between observed relative GNP
growth and the growth rates of relative incomes generated from the esti-
mated model. Relative income and actual relative GNP growth are highly
correlated in both periods, but particularly so in the later period. This sug-
gests that our model does indeed replicate the direction of relative income
ﬂuctuations very precisely. However, it generates income series that are much
too smooth relative to output.
We explore two possible solutions to this problem:
The ﬁrst solution is to allow for diﬀerent degrees of diversiﬁcation acrosss
countries. After all, assuming λ to be constant across regions may be an
appropriate assumption for a well integrated ﬁnancial market such as the
United States and the fact that we are able to reproduce cross-state income
ﬂows with considerable precision supports this view. OECD countries on the
other hand, diﬀer considerably in size, population structure and quality of
their ﬁnancial institutions. It appears plausible that λ diﬀers across coun-
tries. We experimented with this possibility. Even though our conclusion is
negative on this issue, we brieﬂy report on our exercise here:
Letting λ diﬀer across countries raises a technical issue: as long as λ is
constant across countries the payoﬀ of the world mutual fund, Y ∗,i sj u s t
the population-weighted average of per capita outputs, hence independent
of λ.A ss o o na sw el e tλ vary, the aggregate feasibility constraint requires
that Y ∗ is weighted with {λk}k=1..K. In estimating the portfolio vector λ = £
λ1 λ2 ... λK
¤
from the levels risk sharing regression we are therefore







t(λ) − λk[ykt − y
∗
t(λ)] (12)
In solving this problem we set all K =2 3starting values equal to the
15estimate of λ obtained in table 2. With these starting values, the algorithm
converged very quickly. To the extent that the algorithm detected portfolio
weights outside the unit interval, we set the weights to zero or unity respec-
tively. Then we reiterated with these new starting values. This procedure
typically converged to a solution within three iterations. Changing the start-
ing value did not alter the estimate of λ, which suggests that the solution to
the non-linear problem is unique.
The estimated portfolio weights diﬀered considerably across countries,
but it is interesting to note that the cross-sectional mean of the entries of λ,
was around 0.6 in the later period and around 0.9 in the earlier period. While
the estimated weights should not be taken too literally (they are available
from the authors upon request), they appeared plausible in that smaller,
more open economies also appeared more diversiﬁed.
We then generated artiﬁcial income data to run the same regressions as
those reported in table 3. Our ﬁndings were virtually identical to those
obtained in tables 3 and 4. This suggests that letting λ vary in the cross-
section may be broadly consistent with the data (after all we replicate the
relative roles of ex-ante and ex-post risk sharing in the 1960-90 period even
with diﬀerent λk), but it cannot help to explain the relative smoothness of
ﬁtted relative income vis a vis the data.
While-cross-sectionally diﬀerent but time invariant portfolio weights can-
not explain the lack of ex-ante risk sharing in the data, our results are con-
sistent with considerable short-term volatility in national portfolio holdings:
Lane (2001) has emphasized that ex-ante risk sharing can take place through
capital gains: if the price of foreign assets is appropriately correlated with
income uncertainty at home, capital gains could contribute to insure a coun-
try’s consumption against adverse output shocks. Capital gains made from
sales of such assets would not be recorded in national income (GNP). Still
they would lead to international capital ﬂows through the current account. If
all ex-ante risk sharing takes place through the purchase of (state-contingent)
assets with a view to reap capital gains, the wedge between GDP and GNP
that measures only capital income (i.e. proﬁt or dividend) ﬂows can be small
or even zero.
Our ﬁndings are therefore consistent with high turnover in international
equity portfolio positions as documented by Tesar and Werner (1995). They
are also in line with Kraay and Ventura (2002) who ﬁnd country portfolio
positions to be remarkably stable in the long-run but very volatile in the
short run. Our results may help to integrate the risk sharing literature with
this recent evidence on international capital ﬂows.
We summarize the results from this sub-section as indicating that the
estimated portfolio shares for both the U.S. and the OECD are quantitatively
16supported by interregional and international income ﬂows. This provides an
important link between the evidence on home bias in stocks and the lack of
international consumption risk sharing, as measured by correlations between
relative output and consumption growth. Our results suggest that the home
bias in portfolios at the international level is substantially lower than the
risk sharing regression evidence would suggest: In our level regressions, our
estimate of OECD home bias (1 − λ) is only 20-40 percent higher than that
for US states (0.6-0.7 relative to around 0.5). At the same time, basic risk
sharing regression suggest that four times more risk is shared among US states
than among OECD countries (estimates of b of 0.15 (US) and 0.80 (OECD)
respectively. In the last substantive section of the paper we therefore assess
to what extent diﬀerences in the structure of business cycles can explain this
result.
5.2 Insurance of permanent and transitory shocks
One important respect in which business cycle structure may inﬂuence the
outcome of risk sharing regressions is the relative contribution of perma-
nent and transitory idiosyncratic shocks to output variability. In existing
ﬁnancial markets, it is harder to insure against permanent ﬂuctuations than
against transitory shocks. The reason for this is that insurance against per-
manent variability in consumption requires countries or regions to insure ex-
ante, whereas transitory ﬂuctuations could be smoothed ex-ante or ex-post,
through borrowing and lending. Ex-ante insurance can only be achieved
through state-contingent assets, e.g. equity. However, such assets will only
exist to the extent that the state of the world, on which they are contingent,
is observable. Otherwise, problems of moral hazard or enforceability may
arise which may render markets endogenously incomplete.
This suggests two possible explanations for the lack of international con-
sumption risk sharing: ﬁrstly, countries could appear less insured because
idiosyncratic output ﬂuctuations are more persistent between countries than
within them. Against the backdrop of our results from the previous section,
this appears as a distinct possibility. After all, portfolio home bias among
US states is not that much smaller than in the OECD, but US states appear
a lot more insured.
Secondly, the existing portfolio structure may provide more insurance
against permanent shocks within countries than between them. This may
have to do with diﬀerent legal frameworks or limited enforceability, as re-
cently argued by Kehoe and Perri (2002), but also with diﬀerent compositions
of national portfolios.
Our framework allows us to distinguish between these two explanations.
17We run separate regressions of idiosyncratic consumption growth rates on
relative growth rates of the permanent and transitory components of output















then give us two separate measures of how consumption is insured against
permanent (bP) and transitory (bT) ﬂuctuations. The permanent components
are constructed in the way described in the previous subsections and the
change in the transitory part is then just ∆yT
t = ∆y − ∆yP.
In table 5 we present the results from this exercise. In U.S. data we
ﬁnd that 85-95 percent of permanent variability is insured whilst a similar
number obtains for transitory ﬂuctuations. In U.S. data we cannot ﬁnd evi-
dence that there is a qualitative diﬀerence between permanent and transitory
shocks to output in as far as their degree of insurability is concerned. This
result is in line with earlier ﬁndings by ASY (1996) who document that idio-
syncratic persistence does not seem to have a big eﬀect on the overall extent
of insurance in U.S. data but that regions with more persistent idiosyncratic
ﬂuctuations rather tend to insure ex-ante.
The picture changes quite substantially once we turn to the regression
with international data. OECD consumption is less insured against both
permanent and transitory shocks than is U.S. consumption. While OECD
countries seem to insure against virtually all transitory variation (the re-
spective coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant), the coeﬃcient on permanent output
variation tells us that only 50 percent of permanent idiosyncratic output
variability is insured at the international level. The diﬀerence between our
estimate of bP at the national and the international level is around 0.35 to
0.4. This is almost the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcient estimates in the
baseline regression. It seems that the home-bias detected in the baseline
regression largely reﬂects a failure of countries to insure against permanent
idiosyncratic risk.
Still, while there is a lot less insurance at the international than at the
regional level, it is important to note that the baseline regression reports
estimates of the overall amount of risk sharing that are below both the de-
gree of risk sharing that we ﬁnd for either permanent or transitory shocks.
This ﬁnding is true in both regional and international data. Again, the dif-
ference can be ascribed to the structure of business cycles: to the extent
that permanent and transitory shocks are not completely insured, the overall
extent of insurance that is achieved will also depend on the covariance struc-
ture of permanent and transitory ﬂuctuations in output. To understand the
18anatomy of this result, we will write the coeﬃcient of the baseline regression
as a function of the coeﬃcients on the transitory and permanent parts of
output respectively:
To keep the following equations tractable, let the tilde denote relative
growth rates of a variable, i.e. b c = ∆c − ∆c∗ and b y = ∆y − ∆y∗. Then the
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are the regression coeﬃcients of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyn-
cratic changes in the permanent and transitory component of output and







If the covariance between changes in the permanent and transitory com-
ponent of output is zero, then the coeﬃcient of the baseline regression is a
weighted average of the extent of insurance achieved for either permanent
or transitory variation in relative outputs. There is, however, no reason to
believe that the covariance term will generally vanish. Therefore, the overall
extent of insurance that is measured by the baseline Mace-Cochrane-ASY
regression is again a function of the structure of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations,
19in this case the covariance structure of permanent and transitory compo-
nents (or, in other words: the covariance structure of innovations in trend
and cycle). If the term cov(b yP,b yT) is positive, the baseline regression will
detect a lower b, hence more insurance; if the covariance is negative, we see
less insurance.
While equation (13) has been derived without any restrictions from the-
ory, the intuition behind it can be understood in the framework of the per-
manent income hypothesis. Suppose a country enjoys a permanent positive
idiosyncratic shock against which it was not or only partially insured ex-
ante. Assume for simplicity that the country is however completely insured
against transitory shocks. According to the relative variant of the PIH we
have considered, relative consumption should instantaneously adjust to the
new permanent level of relative output. If the adjustment of output to its new
permanent level is gradual, then current consumption should overshoot cur-
rent relative output ﬂuctuations, making consumption appear more volatile
than output. But a gradual adjustment in output just means that an in-
crease (decrease) in the permanent level decreases (increases) the transitory
component. Hence, the change in the transitory and the change in the per-
manent component are negatively correlated - and this case, equation (13)
would indeed predict that, ceteris paribus we ﬁnd less insurance.
Conversely, if the permanent positive shock is also associated with a posi-
tive change in the transitory component, then this implies that current output
changes will be larger than permanent changes. Because consumption will
mainly adjust to the permanent part, it will react less strongly than current
output changes, making consumption appear more insured in the basic risk
sharing regression.
Against this backdrop, equation (13) provides a decomposition of the
original risk sharing coeﬃcient into a ’business-cycle adjusted’ risk sharing
coeﬃcient and into a component that accounts for diﬀerent business cycle
structures. The adjusted risk sharing coeﬃcient, badj is the ﬁrst term on the
RHS of equation (13):
badj =[ αbP +( 1 − α)bT] (14)
The impact of business cycle structure, i.e. in particular of the covariance






Using this decomposition, we can now answer to what extent the apparent
lack of consumption risk sharing at the national and the international levels
20is due to a) a relatively low degree of insurance against permanent shocks,
b) a relatively large component of permanent shocks (as measured by α)o r
c) diﬀerences in the covariance of permanent and transitory components of
the idiosyncratic business cycle.
Table 6 gives estimates of the share of permanent shocks in the business
cycle, α,a n do fstruc, the measure of business cycle structure. Our estimates
were obtained from the panel regressions based on the VAR-permanent com-
ponent. As is apparent from the table, US federal states do not have a
systemically lower share of permanent variation in their idiosyncratic busi-
ness cycles. Nor is there a marked diﬀerence in business cycle structure,
struc, between OECD countries and US states. In terms of our measures,
US regional and world business cycles seem surprisingly similar.
What is the contribution of business cycle structure to the lack of con-
sumption risk sharing? The third column of table 6 provides the ﬁtted or
adjusted b-coeﬃcient, according to (14). In calculating badj,w eh a v eu s e d
the estimates from table 5. It turns out that both OECD countries and US
federal states would display twice as much risk sharing if there was no cor-
relation between the transitory and the permanent parts of relative output
(i.e. if struc = 1). However, while business cycle structure seems impor-
tant in explaining how much risk is shared, US and world business cycles
are far too similar for this to make a diﬀerence in explaining the lack of in-
ternational consumption risk sharing. According to the results in table 4,
it seems that countries fail to insure against permanent variation in relative
outputs, whereas US states are able to obtain insurance against virtually all
idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations in permanent income.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have examined the link between the structure of business
cycles and consumption insurance. Consumption based tests suggest that
there is much less risk sharing at the international than at the regional level.
However, risk sharing, both in international as well as in regional data sets
seems incomplete.
To the extent that risk sharing is incomplete, the structure of business
cycles may matter for the degree of insurance that is eventually achieved,
given the degree of international diversiﬁcation. We have used the concept
of a portfolio of Shiller securities to distinguish between the extent of inter-
national diversiﬁcation (as measured by the value weighted share of a world
mutual fund in a country’s income) and the degree of insurance. We ﬁnd
that U.S. federal states are much less diversiﬁed than simple risk sharing
21regressions would suggest: their home bias is about 50 percentage points.
Conversely, in data from OECD countries, we ﬁnd a home bias of about 90
percent in the period 1960-90, but of only 60 percent in the period 1980-2000.
This is much lower than evidence based on international equity portfolio hold-
ings (French and Poterba (1991)) would suggest. While standard risk sharing
regressions ﬁnd a lot less consumption insurance in international data, our
ﬁndings also suggest that a sizable component may be due to diﬀerences in
the structure of international business cycles.
Our estimates of national and regional degrees of diversiﬁcation are also
consistent with ﬂow evidence on international and interregional income ﬂows.
In U.S. data, our model exactly matches the evidence on ex-ante and ex-
post consumption insurance as examined by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha.
In international data, ﬁtted relative income growth rates derived from our
model are highly correlated with relative GNP growth rates but generally less
volatile. We ﬁnd that country heterogenity cannot account for this result.
Rather the high volatility of international asset positions, as documented in
Tesar and Werner (1995) and Kraay and Ventura (2002), seems to play an
important role in explaining this ﬁnding.
Our method has also allowed us to investigate whether international
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations represent an altogether diﬀerent type of risk
than national business cycles. This could be the case to the extent that
idiosyncratic output ﬂuctuations have a bigger permanent component in in-
ternational data than in regional data. There are good theoretical reasons to
believe that permanent shocks are less insurable in existing ﬁnancial markets
than transitory ﬂuctuations. Therefore, diﬀerent degrees of persistence of
asymmetric business cycles may be responsible for the home bias, without
markets per se being less complete between countries than within. However,
we ﬁnd that such structural diﬀerences cannot account for the home bias.
Rather, we document that U.S. federal states are much more successful than
OECD countries in achieving insurance in particular against permanent idio-
syncratic output shocks. The lack of international consumption risk sharing
(as measured by basic risk sharing regressions) can almost exclusively be
ascribed to this factor.
There is a wealth of studies that have looked at risk sharing at either the
U.S. state or at the international level. With only a few exceptions (Hess
and Shin (1998), DelNegro (2002)) most of them reach the conclusion that
there is much more risk sharing within countries than among them. Most
of them also ﬁnd that consumption risk-sharing is generally incomplete, be
it at the international or national level. However, the exact numbers vary
widely across studies. While this is partly due to diﬀerent data sets, the
econometric speciﬁcations employed are also often quite diﬀerent (compare
22e.g. the setup in Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) to Crucini (1999)).
This paper has shown that slight changes in speciﬁcation can have a huge
impact on the outcome of risk sharing regressions. In this paper, we have
suggested an economic reinterpretation of the typical outcomes from diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of the risk sharing regression. In so doing, we have oﬀered a new
way to understand how consumption risk is allocated, both at the national
as well as the international level.
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II. Log linearization of permanent values (Equation(7)):


















































25Now use a log-linear approximation to write
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Appendix III: construction of permanent (log)output levels
We follow Crucini (1999) in comparing two alternative speciﬁcations for
the permanent components of home and foreign output. First, we consider
a univariate AR(1) process in growth rates of home and foreign output.
∆y
k









This speciﬁcation implicitly assumes that there are no spillovers between
home and RoW output. We therefore also consider a VAR speciﬁcation in
26output growth rates. In this speciﬁcation, we also take into consideration that
the maintained hypothesis in this paper is that aggregate consumption equals
permanent income. If this is the case, then aggregate consumption should
be a suﬃcient statistic for expected future levels of output. We therefore use
the methodology ﬁrst suggested by Campbell and Shiller (1989) and include








denote the vector of endogenous variables. Then we estimate the VAR-
model
∆xt = A∆xt−1+εt




































To construct the relative permanent values yp−y∗P from the VAR-process,


























. In the case of the AR(1)-process we ob-
tain a similar expression in which A gets replaced by the relative degrees of
persistence of the two processes.
In constructing yP −y∗P, we set the real interest rate, r,t o0.02. through-
out.
27Table 1: Basic Risk Sharing Regressions
Regression United States OECD
1960-90 1960-1990 1980-2000
∆c − ∆c∗ = b(∆y − ∆y∗) 0.15 (0.03) 0.79 (0.04) 0.84 (0.09)
Table 2: Estimates of the home bias (1 − λ)
Regression United States OECD
(1960-90) 1960-90 1980-2000
c − c∗ =( 1 − λ)(yP − y∗P)
AR(1) 0.42 (0.02) 0.90 (0.02) 0.61 (0.04)
VAR(1) 0.41 (0.02) 0.94 (0.03) 0.60 (0.04)
c − c∗ =( 1 − λ)(y − y∗) 0.50 (0.02) 0.96 (0.02) 0.66 (0.03)
28Table 3: Ex-ante and ex-post risk sharing in ﬁtted and actual GNP data
Regression United States OECD
1960-90 1980-2000
Data ex-ante ex-post ex-ante ex-post ex-ante ex-post
ﬁtted 0.53 0.31 0.08 0.16 0.43 -0.28
(0.02) (0.21) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.09)
actual 0.57 0.27 -0.01 0.24 0.01 0.14
(0.10) (0.21) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09)
ASY (1996) SY98 (1960-90)
Literature 0.52 0.30 0.03 0.25 – –
artiﬁcial data generated with the portfolio shares estimated from the
panel regression with perm. levels based on the VAR
29Table 4






















United Kingdom –— 0.93
Australia 0.78 0.94
New Zealand –— 0.92
artiﬁcial data generated with the portfolio shares estimated from the
panel regression with perm. levels based onthe VAR
30Table 5: Insurance against permanent and transitory shocks
Regression United States OECD
(1960-90) 1960-90 1980-2000
∆c − ∆c∗ = bP(∆yP − ∆y∗P)
bP 0.04 0.53 0.41
(0.17) (0.04) (0.08)
∆c − ∆c∗ = bT(∆yT − ∆y∗T)
bT 0.12 0.10 0.20
(0.24) (0.08) (0.10)
Table 6: Business cycle structure, US states and OECD countries
share of perm. shocks Cov. structure BC-‘Adjusted’ coeﬃcient
αs t r u c b adj
United States 0.64 2.20 .07
OECD
1960-90 0.73 2.01 0.41
1980-2000 0.61 3.01 0.32
In the calculation of the adjusted b, the estimates from table 5 have been used
31Figure 1: The OECD data set
a) OECD countries 1960-90











b) OECD countries 1980-2000












32Figure 2: US and OECD data superimposed
a) US and OECD(60-90)data
b)US and OECD(1980-2000)data
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